
STRATEGIC COMPENSATION: INVESTIGATING THE EFFICIENCY RATIONALE FOR PAY COMPRESSION IN SELF-MANAGED WORK TEAMS
Abstract
This research delves into the strategic implementation of pay compression within self-managed work teams, aiming to investigate its efficiency rationale. Pay compression, characterized by minimized pay differentials between team members, has gained attention as a potential mechanism to enhance collaboration and performance in self-managed teams. Through a comprehensive analysis of organizational practices, employee perceptions, and performance outcomes, this study seeks to uncover the nuanced dynamics of strategic compensation in self-managed work teams. The findings contribute valuable insights to organizational management strategies, shedding light on the implications of pay compression for team dynamics, motivation, and overall efficiency.
Keywords
Strategic compensation, pay compression, self-managed work teams
References
Appelbaum, E., Bailey, T., Berg, P., & Kalleberg, A. (2000). Manufacturing advantage: Why high-performance work systems pay off. Cornell University Press.
Hackman, J. R., & Oldham, G. R. (1976). Motivation through the design of work: Test of a theory. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16(2), 250-279.
Lawler, E. E. (1981). Pay and organizational effectiveness: A psychological view. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
Milkovich, G. T., & Newman, J. M. (2004). Compensation (8th ed.). McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Mohrman, S. A., Cohen, S. G., & Mohrman Jr, A. M. (1995). Designing team-based organizations: New forms for knowledge work. Jossey-Bass.
Pierce, J. L., & Dunham, R. B. (1987). Organizational structure, individual differences, and member attitudes. Organization Studies, 8(3), 183-201.
Rynes, S. L., Gerhart, B., & Parks, L. (2005). Personnel psychology: Performance evaluation and pay for performance. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 571-600.
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in action: Social science bases of administrative theory. McGraw-Hill.
Article Statistics
Copyright License
Copyright (c) 2023 Samuel Fischer

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.