FISCAL ILLUSION AND PROGRESSIVE TAXATION WITH RETROSPECTIVE VOTING
Abstract
This article explores the relationship between fiscal illusion, progressive taxation, and retrospective voting in the context of political decision-making. Fiscal illusion refers to the phenomenon where taxpayers are deceived or misled about the true cost and impact of government policies, particularly regarding taxation. Progressive taxation, on the other hand, is a system that imposes higher tax rates on individuals with higher incomes. Retrospective voting occurs when voters evaluate the performance of incumbents based on past outcomes rather than future promises. By examining these three concepts together, this article aims to shed light on how fiscal illusion may influence support for progressive taxation and how retrospective voting can shape tax policies.
Keywords
Fiscal illusion, progressive taxation, retrospective votingHow to Cite
References
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