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American Journal Of Social Sciences And Humanity Research

Peer Reviewed | Open Access | E-ISSN: 2771-2141
Published Article

Strategic and Geopolitical Analysis of The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Implications for China, Japan, And United States Foreign Policy

Strategic and Geopolitical Analysis of The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Implications for China, Japan, And United States Foreign Policy

  • Dr. Arjun Mehta
    Department of Social Sciences, National Institute of Social Research, New Delhi, India
  • Dr. Kavya Sharma
    Department of Sociology, Indian Institute of Social Studies, Jaipur, India
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands East China Sea China-Japan Relations

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute represents a multidimensional strategic contest involving sovereignty, maritime security, national identity, alliance credibility, and regional power competition. Although the disputed islands are geographically limited, their strategic significance extends across the wider East China Sea and directly influences the security calculations of China, Japan, and the United States. This research examines the dispute through a strategic-geopolitical framework developed from the supplied literature, emphasizing sovereignty narratives, maritime strategy, gray-zone competition, alliance deterrence, domestic political constraints, and technological cooperation. The study adopts a qualitative analytical methodology based exclusively on the provided references and synthesizes their arguments to identify recurring strategic patterns. The findings indicate that the dispute cannot be adequately explained through territorial competition alone. China’s approach combines historical narratives, maritime capabilities, coast guard activity, and domestic legitimacy considerations, while Japan increasingly links territorial defense to broader national security and alliance planning. For the United States, the dispute represents a test of alliance assurance and regional deterrence. The analysis further finds that technological cooperation, maritime surveillance, and coordinated alliance architecture are becoming increasingly important alongside conventional military capabilities. The study concludes that strategic stability requires simultaneously managing territorial claims, domestic political pressures, gray-zone activities, and escalation risks.

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