

International Experience in Preventing Family (Domestic) Violence Offences: A Comparative Analysis and Prospects for Adaptation to Uzbekistan's National System

Khurshid Nadjimovich Atanazarov

Deputy Head of the Surkhandarya Regional Department of Internal Affairs – Head of the Investigation Department, Colonel, Uzbekistan

Received: 26 July 2026; **Accepted:** 20 August 2026; **Published:** 12 September 2026

Abstract: This article presents a comparative criminological analysis of approaches to preventing family (domestic) violence in Austria, Spain, the United Kingdom, Finland, the United States, Japan, France, Italy and Portugal. The mechanisms used in these jurisdictions are assessed in terms of early risk identification, victim protection, inter-agency coordination, interventions targeting perpetrator behaviour, and electronic monitoring. The analysis demonstrates that, for Uzbekistan, the most appropriate course is not the direct transplantation of foreign institutions but the careful adaptation of their effective elements to existing national mechanisms.

Keywords: Family (domestic) violence, international experience, risk assessment, protection order, inter-agency cooperation, shelter, reporting channels, perpetrator intervention programme, electronic monitoring, prevention.

Introduction: The study of international experience has considerable scholarly and practical value for improving systems designed to prevent offences related to family (domestic) violence. Comparative analysis, however, should not be reduced to a sequential description of laws adopted or institutions established in different countries. The value of a foreign model lies not in the name of a particular institution, but in the stage at which it identifies risk, the manner in which it protects the victim, the way it influences the behaviour of the perpetrator, and the mechanisms through which it coordinates the work of public authorities.

The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (the Istanbul Convention) conceptualises state policy in this field through several interrelated dimensions: prevention, protection of victims, prosecution of perpetrators, and integrated and coordinated policies [1]. Within this framework, the police, courts, social and health services, child

protection bodies, and non-governmental organisations are not expected to operate in isolation; rather, their activities should contribute to a common preventive objective.

Accordingly, this study evaluates foreign experience not primarily by country, but by the function performed by a particular preventive mechanism. The principal areas of comparison are: early risk identification; separation of the victim from the source of danger; inter-agency management of high-risk cases; alternative reporting channels; access to shelters and integrated services; programmes aimed at changing perpetrator behaviour; and electronic monitoring of compliance with protective restrictions.

The aim of the study is to examine the substance and practical significance of these mechanisms, identify their common and distinctive features, and provide a scholarly basis for determining which elements may be adapted to improve the existing system of domestic violence prevention in Uzbekistan.

METHODS

The study draws on materials relating to the Istanbul Convention; Austrian security-police legislation; Spain's VioGén system and electronic monitoring arrangements; the United Kingdom's DASH and MARAC mechanisms and standards for work with perpetrators; Finland's shelter system; the United States' Danger Assessment and Family Justice Center models; Japan's Spousal Violence Counselling and Support Centers; alternative reporting mechanisms in France, Italy and the Canary Islands; and Portugal's experience with remote electronic monitoring [1–22].

The research employed comparative legal and comparative criminological methods, logical analysis, systematisation and generalisation. The foreign mechanisms were compared against the following criteria: the stage at which risk is identified; the basis for initiating intervention; the method used to secure the victim's safety; the form of inter-agency cooperation; the content of work with the perpetrator; monitoring and reassessment procedures; the protection of personal data; and the criteria used to evaluate effectiveness.

The feasibility of applying foreign mechanisms in Uzbekistan was assessed by reference to their function rather than their external institutional form. A mechanism that operates effectively in one jurisdiction may not produce the same results if reproduced unchanged in a different legal and social environment. For this reason, the study gives priority to adaptation rather than direct transplantation.

RESULTS

1. Early Risk Identification and Separation of the Victim from the Perpetrator

One important development in foreign domestic violence policy has been a shift away from requiring the victim to leave the home and towards temporarily removing or restricting the person who creates the danger. Under section 38a of Austria's Security Police Act, where specific facts indicate a risk of a dangerous attack on life, health or liberty, the police may prohibit the perpetrator from entering the victim's home and from approaching the victim within a prescribed distance [2].

A key feature of the Austrian approach is that the initial police intervention is linked to subsequent support. Once intervention centres receive information from

the police, they may contact the victim without waiting for a separate application, discuss safety needs, and facilitate access to appropriate legal and social services [2]. This creates a continuous chain of support after the first intervention and reduces the risk that the victim will be left to navigate the system alone.

Spain's VioGén system provides another relevant example. It brings together information held by authorised institutions, assesses risk, determines protective measures according to the identified level of risk, and allows reassessment when circumstances change [4]. Risk is therefore treated not as a fixed status determined once, but as a dynamic condition that may change in response to developments in the relationship or to new events.

In the United Kingdom, the DASH risk-identification framework provides the police, social services, health professionals and other organisations with a common structure for initial screening. It directs attention to stalking, controlling behaviour, threats to kill, access to weapons, pregnancy, risks to children and the victim's own fear [3]. Its principal value lies in helping practitioners collect information in a consistent manner and in reducing the likelihood that significant risk factors will be overlooked.

The Danger Assessment, developed in the United States, is designed specifically to assess the risk of intimate partner homicide or near-fatal violence and incorporates a set of specialised risk indicators [5]. Although it has substantial empirical value, applying it in another jurisdiction without prior validation would be inappropriate. Any such instrument should first be tested against local criminal cases, relationship patterns and the broader social context.

The comparative analysis indicates that effective risk assessment requires at least three conditions. First, the relevant risk indicators must be defined in advance. Second, they should be assessed in combination rather than in isolation. Third, assessment should be repeated following a new complaint, threat, breach of a restriction, separation, or another material change in circumstances. In this sense, foreign practice treats risk assessment not as a mechanism for establishing liability, but as a tool for making proportionate preventive decisions.

Table 1. Selected foreign mechanisms for risk identification and initial protection

Mechanism	Country	Primary function	Preventive significance
-----------	---------	------------------	-------------------------

Exclusion and non-approach order	Austria	Temporarily separating the source of danger from the victim	Rapid protection without requiring the victim to leave the home
VioGén	Spain	Integrating information and reassessing risk	Organising protection and monitoring in accordance with the level of risk
DASH	United Kingdom	Systematic identification of initial risk factors	Reducing the likelihood that significant risk indicators will be overlooked
Danger Assessment	United States	Assessing the risk of homicide or severe violence	Helping to identify high-risk cases

2. Inter-Agency Management of High-Risk Cases

Information relevant to domestic violence risk is often generated simultaneously within the police, health services, social services, education, courts and other institutions. Where such information remains fragmented, the overall level of risk may remain unclear even when each individual body has formally performed its own functions.

The Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC), developed in the United Kingdom, coordinates the information and actions of different agencies in relation to high-risk victims [6]. It is not designed to bring every family conflict before a commission; rather, it focuses on cases involving a high risk of serious harm or death. Its central advantage is therefore the concentration of institutional resources on the most dangerous cases.

Within the MARAC process, the police, housing and child protection services, health services, probation and other bodies assume specific responsibilities. The Independent Domestic Violence Adviser (IDVA) also plays a significant role in maintaining consistent contact with the victim, assessing safety needs, connecting the victim with services, and providing support through relevant procedures [7].

The principal lesson from this model is that inter-agency cooperation cannot be reduced to information exchange. It should be outcome-oriented and linked to clearly allocated tasks, a responsible officer, implementation deadlines and a review date. Without

these elements, cooperation may become a series of meetings and exchanges of information without a measurable effect on risk.

3. Alternative Reporting Channels and Rapid Access to Assistance

The hidden nature of domestic violence may be intensified where the victim's telephone use, movement or communication is controlled. For this reason, several jurisdictions have developed additional reporting channels alongside conventional police calls, including code words, SMS services, online chats, mobile applications and reporting through pharmacies.

Under the United Kingdom's Ask for Angela initiative, a person in a potentially unsafe situation may use a recognised code phrase to seek assistance from trained staff at participating venues [8]. In the Canary Islands, the Mascarilla-19 initiative enables pharmacy staff to treat a code word as a signal requiring the activation of relevant services [9]. France uses a combination of pharmacies, dedicated telephone numbers and online reporting channels [10], while Italy's YouPol application allows users to submit reports, photographs, videos, audio files and geolocation information [11].

Uzbekistan's Call Umida initiative has likewise demonstrated the feasibility of establishing a network of safe points for girls and women in public spaces [12]. Although the initiative was not specifically designed for domestic violence, its underlying model—a code phrase, trained staff, a safe location and connection to further assistance—shows that similar low-threshold

reporting mechanisms can operate in the national context.

In such models, staff in shops or pharmacies should not be expected to investigate violence, assess the level of risk, or reconcile the parties. Their role is to recognise the signal, move the person to a safe space, and connect the person with an appropriate service. An alternative reporting channel is therefore not an independent protective measure; it is effective only when followed by a functioning chain of public and social-service responses.

4. Shelters and Integrated Service Provision

The preventive value of an initial report is reduced if, after leaving a dangerous environment, the victim has no safe place to stay, cannot remain temporarily with children, or lacks access to legal and psychological support. The Istanbul Convention identifies the availability of safe and adequately resourced specialist shelters as an important protective measure [13].

Finnish legislation defines shelter services as free, round-the-clock crisis services available to persons subjected to violence or threatened by violence [14]. The significance of this approach lies in treating a shelter not merely as temporary accommodation, but as an integrated service combining safe residence, psychosocial support, counselling and referral to further assistance.

The Family Justice Center model in the United States seeks to bring police, legal, medical, social and non-governmental services together in one place or within a single organisational framework [15]. This reduces the need for victims to move repeatedly between institutions and recount the same events multiple times. Japan's Spousal Violence Counselling and Support Centers similarly provide counselling, emergency protection, psychological support, assistance in rebuilding independent living, and help in accessing court-ordered protective measures [16].

These examples suggest that the effectiveness of a support system depends less on the number of services available than on how well those services are connected. Referral from one service to another is not sufficient; the system should also establish whether the victim actually received the necessary assistance and whether the victim's safety improved.

5. Programmes for Perpetrators of Domestic Violence

Domestic violence prevention cannot be limited to victim protection alone. Where a perpetrator's controlling behaviour, justification of violence, victim-blaming or aggressive reactions remain unchanged, the risk may re-emerge after formal legal restrictions expire.

Article 16 of the Istanbul Convention calls for programmes aimed at changing the behaviour of perpetrators of domestic violence. Current standards in the United Kingdom likewise require perpetrator interventions to place victim safety at the centre and to be responsive to the perpetrator's level of risk and individual needs [17].

A perpetrator intervention programme should not be reduced to a routine psychological conversation or a generic "anger-management" course. Its purpose should include acknowledgement of personal responsibility for violence, rejection of coercive control and victim-blaming, and development of skills for resolving conflict without violence. The form and duration of the programme should vary according to the individual's risk level and needs [17].

It is important to note that comparable organisational mechanisms are also emerging in Uzbekistan. In particular, the Temporary Instruction approved by the Joint Resolution No. 99/55/08.08-06/35 of 11 August 2026 of the Committee for Family and Women of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Association of Mahallas of Uzbekistan treats work with a person who has committed violence not as an isolated preventive activity, but as a sequence of interconnected stages.

Under this mechanism, relevant cases involve the issuance of a protection order, development of an individual behaviour-change programme, referral for implementation, one month of monitoring, and a final assessment of outcomes. The psychologist is also required to examine the individual's psychological condition, personal characteristics, behaviour and propensity for violence, and to prepare a final opinion for determining subsequent measures [18].

In the author's view, the significance of this mechanism lies in its attempt to transform a correction programme from a one-off preventive conversation into a structured process for monitoring behavioural change. In substantive terms, this approach is close to the principle found in foreign practice of linking perpetrator programmes with risk assessment, inter-agency cooperation and follow-up monitoring.

At the same time, programme effectiveness should not be assessed solely by the number of persons referred to or completing the programme. More meaningful indicators include whether violence recurs after completion, whether protection-order requirements are observed, whether aggressive and controlling behaviour changes, and whether the victim's level of safety improves.

Research evidence indicates that mandatory perpetrator programmes do not produce uniform

outcomes in all cases. The meta-analysis by J.C. Babcock and co-authors found that conventional programmes had only limited effects on subsequent violence [19]. Materials of the U.S. National Institute of Justice likewise indicate that participant selection and research methodology must be taken into account when evaluating programme outcomes [20]. Accordingly, completion of a course cannot, by itself, be treated as evidence of effectiveness.

6. Electronic Monitoring of High-Risk Perpetrators

Where the effectiveness of a non-approach order depends solely on voluntary compliance by the perpetrator or on the victim's ability to report a breach after it occurs, protection may be insufficient in high-risk cases. Some jurisdictions therefore use technological means to monitor compliance with court-ordered exclusion or non-approach measures.

Spain's telematic monitoring system combines a device worn by the perpetrator, a receiver provided to the victim, defined exclusion zones, a 24-hour monitoring centre and rapid police response [21]. The system can generate an alert not only after a restriction has been

breached, but also when the perpetrator begins to approach the victim within a prohibited or dangerous distance.

France's bracelet anti-rapprochement is likewise applied on the basis of a reasoned judicial decision, while the installation of the device and processing of geolocation data take place under state control [22]. Portugal's experience further demonstrates that remote monitoring requires coordination among procedural decision-making, the powers of the implementing authority, technological infrastructure and data-protection requirements [23].

The preventive value of electronic monitoring lies not in its automatic application to every protection order, but in its targeted use as an additional safeguard in high-risk cases involving previous breaches of restrictions, stalking, strangulation, threats to kill, access to weapons, or serious repeated violence. Judicial oversight, a defined duration, periodic review and robust guarantees for the protection of personal data are therefore essential.

Table 2. Functional comparison of foreign mechanisms and their relevance for national practice

Area	Foreign example	Key strength	Relevance for Uzbekistan
Risk assessment	VioGén, DASH, Danger Assessment	Systematising risk indicators and reassessing risk	Developing a national risk-assessment tool validated against local data
Inter-agency cooperation	MARAC, IDVA	Clear responsibilities in high-risk cases	Targeted inter-agency review limited to high-risk cases
Alternative reporting	Ask for Angela, Mascarilla-19, YouPol	Discreet and rapid signalling	Linking existing safe points to a unified response protocol
Integrated services	Finnish shelters, Family Justice Centers, Japanese support centres	Bringing multiple services together around the victim	Moving from referral counts to monitoring whether services are actually received

Perpetrator intervention	United Kingdom standards	Programmes tailored to risk and need	Differentiating behaviour-change programmes according to risk level
Electronic monitoring	Spain, France, Portugal	Technical enforcement of non-approach restrictions	Potential for a limited, legally controlled pilot in high-risk cases

DISCUSSION

The comparative analysis shows that the most developed approaches to preventing domestic violence are not based on a single institution, but on a chain of interconnected measures. In Austria, rapid police intervention is linked to follow-up intervention services; in Spain, risk assessment is linked to monitoring and electronic control; in the United Kingdom, high-risk assessment is connected with inter-agency coordination; and in Finland, shelter provision is integrated with subsequent social support.

The relevant question is therefore not whether Uzbekistan should replicate the name or organisational form of a particular foreign institution, but what specific problem that institution solves. The value of MARAC lies not in creating another commission, but in bringing information from different agencies together for a single high-risk case. The value of VioGén lies not merely in creating an electronic platform, but in treating risk as dynamic and subject to repeated reassessment. The value of the Family Justice Center is not the creation of a new building or agency, but the reduction of fragmentation in the victim's pathway through services.

Foreign experience also demonstrates that low-risk family conflict and high-risk violence cannot be addressed through identical preventive measures. In lower-risk conflicts that have not escalated into physical violence, counselling, early psychological assistance and voluntary preventive interventions may be appropriate. By contrast, where there is strangulation, a threat to kill, stalking, access to weapons, breach of a protective measure, or a direct threat to children, general reconciliation-oriented measures are insufficient.

Uzbekistan already has protection orders, local prevention inspectors, 'Inson' Social Services Centres, rehabilitation services, perpetrator behaviour-change programmes and electronic record-keeping mechanisms. Accordingly, the principal task is not to

multiply institutions, but to reduce gaps between existing mechanisms. The most important lesson from foreign practice is that, once a risk signal has been received, no stage of the process should remain unmanaged until the victim's safety has been stabilised.

Preventive effectiveness should therefore be assessed not by the number of activities carried out, but by subsequent reports, compliance with protective measures, changes in the assessed level of risk, the victim's actual use of services, and the recurrence of violence. Most of the mechanisms examined in this study are distinguished precisely by their capacity to monitor outcomes and adjust subsequent decisions accordingly.

POLICY AND PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the comparative analysis, the following recommendations are proposed for improving the national system.

1. Establish a three-tier national risk-assessment system. At the first stage, the 102-emergency call service, a local prevention inspector, a health professional or a social worker should conduct a brief assessment of immediate threats to life and safety. At the second stage, the history of violence, controlling behaviour, stalking, risks to children and the effects of previous measures should be assessed comprehensively. At the third stage, high-risk cases should be referred for inter-agency review. National risk indicators should be empirically validated against criminal-case materials and repeated reports.

2. Introduce targeted inter-agency review for high- and very-high-risk cases. The purpose should not be to refer every family conflict to a commission, but to select cases involving a high risk of serious harm or repeated violence. Each review should result in a single plan setting out concrete measures, responsible officers, implementation deadlines, a safe method of contacting the victim, and a date for reassessment.

3. Designate a permanent case coordinator for high-

risk victims. The coordinator should not make decisions on behalf of the victim, but should ensure connection to necessary services, follow implementation of agreed measures, and maintain continuity in subsequent risk assessment.

4. Integrate alternative and discreet reporting channels into a unified response protocol. Existing initiatives such as Call Umida, safe points in public places and digital reporting tools could be piloted as additional signalling channels for domestic violence. Staff receiving a code phrase should not investigate the violence; their role should be to move the person to a safe location and connect them with the appropriate service.

5. Organise victim services around a 'one report – one continuous support pathway' principle. Legal, social, medical, psychological and temporary accommodation services should be connected. Monitoring should focus not on where the victim was referred, but on whether the service was actually received and whether it produced a result.

6. Differentiate perpetrator intervention programmes according to risk and individual need. Low-risk cases may require brief early intervention; medium-risk cases may require specialised individual or group programmes; and high-risk cases may require behaviour-change work combined with protective measures, inter-agency oversight and appropriate medical or psychological support. Programme effectiveness should be assessed through subsequent violence and compliance with restrictions, not merely course completion.

7. Examine court-supervised electronic proximity monitoring through a limited legal pilot for high-risk cases. The mechanism should not apply to every protection order, but could be considered where there have been previous breaches, stalking, strangulation, threats to kill, access to weapons, or serious repeated violence. The exclusion distance, duration of monitoring, response protocol and safeguards for geolocation data should be specified in advance.

8. Pilot a national early-intervention model for low- and medium-risk family conflicts. Such a model should be confined to cases without indicators of severe violence and may combine safe de-escalation, responsibility-focused guidance, access to help, and brief digital reminders. Cases involving physical violence, strangulation, weapons, threats to kill, stalking, breach of a protection order or direct danger to children should be excluded from this lighter mechanism.

9. Evaluate preventive effectiveness through outcome indicators. Core indicators should include repeated

reports, recurrence of violence, breaches of protective measures, reduction in the assessed level of risk, the victim's actual use of services, and implementation of the decisions taken.

CONCLUSION

International experience demonstrates that effective prevention of family (domestic) violence cannot be limited to establishing liability or imposing a temporary protective measure. A functioning system requires the receipt of an initial risk signal, structured assessment of risk, separation of the victim from the source of danger, access to necessary services, intervention in perpetrator behaviour, coordination of institutional responsibilities, and subsequent review of outcomes.

The central conclusion of the comparative analysis is that, for Uzbekistan, connecting existing mechanisms through a coherent risk-management logic is more important than creating additional institutions. Foreign experience should therefore be treated not as a model to be copied, but as a source of tested solutions to specific problems. Any new mechanism should be piloted against Uzbekistan's legal framework, social context, operational capacity and local empirical evidence before being introduced on a wider scale.

Accordingly, the principal measure of a prevention system should not be the number of activities undertaken, but the victim's actual safety, the reduction of repeated violence, and the implementation of decisions in practice. The greatest relevance of the international approaches examined here lies in showing how domestic violence prevention can be transformed from a collection of discrete measures into a continuous, outcome-oriented process.

REFERENCES

1. Council of Europe. Key Facts about the Istanbul Convention: Four Aims — Prevention, Protection, Prosecution and Co-ordinated Policies; The Convention: Integrated Policies. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention/key-facts>; <https://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention/the-convention> (accessed 6 August 2026).
2. Republik Österreich. Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Sicherheitsverwaltung und die Ausübung der Sicherheitspolizei (Sicherheitspolizeigesetz – SPG), §§ 25, 38a. <https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/NormDokument.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005792&Paragraf=38a>; <https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/1991/566/P25/NOR40229126> (accessed 6 August 2026).

3. UK Home Office. Domestic Abuse: Statutory Guidance. 2022, paras. 228–229. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/domestic-abuse-act-2021/domestic-abuse-statutory-guidance-accessible-version> (accessed 6 August 2026).
4. Ministerio del Interior de España. Sistema de Seguimiento Integral en los casos de Violencia de Género – Sistema VioGén 2. <https://interior.gob.es/opencms/es/servicios-al-ciudadano/violencia-contra-la-mujer/sistema-viogen-2/> (accessed 6 August 2026).
5. Campbell, J.C., Webster, D.W., & Glass, N. (2009). The Danger Assessment: Validation of a Lethality Risk Assessment Instrument for Intimate Partner Femicide. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 24(4), 653–674. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260508317180>; <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7878014/> (accessed 6 August 2026).
6. UK Home Office. Domestic Abuse: Statutory Guidance. 2022, para. 433 (MARAC). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/domestic-abuse-act-2021/domestic-abuse-statutory-guidance-accessible-version> (accessed 6 August 2026).
7. Ministry of Justice. Independent Domestic Violence Adviser Statutory Guidance. 9 May 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-domestic-violence-adviser-statutory-guidance> (accessed 6 August 2026).
8. Ask for Angela. What is Ask for Angela? How It Works; Frequently Asked Questions. <https://www.askforangela.co.uk/>; <https://www.askforangela.co.uk/faqs> (accessed 6 August 2026).
9. Instituto Canario de Igualdad. Mascarilla-19: campaña sobre el recurso para atender la violencia de género. https://www.gobiernodecanarias.org/igualdad/comunicacion/comunicacion_institucional/cam_violencia_genero/mascarilla19/ (accessed 10 August 2026).
10. Ministère de l'Intérieur de la République française. Engagement des pharmacies pour permettre l'accueil des victimes de violences intrafamiliales; Violences conjugales, sexuelles et sexistes: ne rien laisser passer. <https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/nerienlaisserpasser> (accessed 10 August 2026).
11. Polizia di Stato. YouPol – La tua sicurezza a portata di smartphone. <https://youpol.poliziadistato.it/landing> (accessed 6 August 2026).
12. United Nations Development Programme in Uzbekistan. “Call Umida”: An Initiative to Make Streets Safer for Girls and Women. 15 September 2022; Uzum Market Joins UNDP’s “Call Umida” Initiative. 11 March 2025. <https://www.undp.org/uzbekistan/blog/call-umida-initiative-make-streets-safer-girls-and-women>; <https://www.undp.org/uzbekistan/press-releases/uzum-market-joins-undps-call-umida-initiative> (accessed 10 August 2026).
13. Council of Europe. Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, Article 23 – Shelters; Explanatory Report, paras. 132–135. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbulconvention/text-of-the-convention>; <https://rm.coe.int/1680a48903> (accessed 10 August 2026).
14. Republic of Finland. Act on Reimbursement out of State Funds for Providers of Shelter Services, 1354/2014, sections 1–4; Act Amending Section 12, 551/2022. <https://finlex.fi/en/legislation/2014/1354>; <https://finlex.fi/fi/lainsaadanto/saadoko/koelma/2022/551> (accessed 10 August 2026).
15. United States Department of Justice, Office on Violence Against Women. The President’s Family Justice Center Initiative; About the Office on Violence Against Women. <https://www.justice.gov/archive/ovw/pfjci.htm>; <https://www.justice.gov/ovw/about-office> (accessed 10 August 2026).
16. Gender Equality Bureau, Cabinet Office of Japan. Spousal Violence Counselling and Support Centers. https://www.gender.go.jp/policy/no_violence/e-vaw/soudankikan/01.html (accessed 11 August 2026).
17. Vera-Gray, F., Kelly, L., Lovett, J., & Westmarland, N. Standards for Stalking and Domestic Abuse Perpetrator Interventions. 2nd ed. London: Home Office, 2026; Westmarland, N., & Kelly, L. Standards for Domestic Abuse Perpetrator Interventions. London: Home Office, 2023. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/standards-for-stalking-and-domestic-abuseperpetrator-interventions> (accessed 11 August 2026).
18. Committee for Family and Women of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and Association of

Mahallas of Uzbekistan. Joint Resolution No. 99/55/08.08-06/35 of 11 August 2026, "On Approval of the Temporary Instruction on Ensuring Participation in Behaviour-Change Programmes for Violent Conduct at Family and Women Centres" [in Uzbek].

19. Babcock, J.C., Green, C.E., & Robie, C. (2004). Does Batterers' Treatment Work? A Meta-Analytic Review of Domestic Violence Treatment. *Clinical Psychology Review*, 23(8), 1023–1053.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2002.07.001>;
<https://www.ojp.gov/library/publications/does-batterers-treatment-work-meta-analytic-review-domestic-violence-treatment> (accessed 11 August 2026).
20. Jackson, S., Feder, L., Forde, D.R., Davis, R.C., Maxwell, C.D., & Taylor, B.G. (2003). *Batterer Intervention Programs: Where Do We Go from Here?* Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
<https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/batterer-intervention-programs-where-do-we-go-here> (accessed 11 August 2026).
21. Ministerio de Igualdad de España. Dispositivos de control telemático de medidas y penas de alejamiento.
<https://violenciagenero.igualdad.gob.es/informacion-3/recursos/dispositivosControlTelematico/> (accessed 12 August 2026).
22. République française. Violences conjugales. Service-Public.fr; Décret n° 2020-1161 du 23 septembre 2020 relatif à la mise en œuvre d'un dispositif électronique mobile anti-rapprochement; Code pénitentiaire, articles R. 631-1–R. 631-6. <https://www.service-public.gouv.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F12544>;
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT00042357259> (accessed 12 August 2026).
23. Assembleia da República Portuguesa. Legislação na área da Violência Doméstica: Lei n.º 33/2010, de 2 de setembro, sobre utilização de meios técnicos de controlo à distância.
https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/paginas/legislacao_areaviolenciadomestica.aspx (accessed 12 August 2026).