

Modernizing Parliamentary Oversight Mechanisms In The Legislative Chamber Of The Oliy Majlis Of The Republic Of Uzbekistan: Constitutional Reforms And Institutional Imperatives

Dr. Bobir-Mirzo A. To'xtayev

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Political Sciences, Acting Associate Professor, Independent Researcher at the National University of Uzbekistan named after Mirzo Ulugbek, Uzbekistan

Received: 30 March 2026; **Accepted:** 28 April 2026; **Published:** 20 May 2026

Abstract: The institutionalization of an effective check-and-balance system remains a crucial indicator of progressive democratic development in the modern global political architecture. This article comprehensively explores the theoretical, legal, and operational frameworks required to modernize the parliamentary oversight mechanisms within the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis (parliament) of Uzbekistan. Drawing on recent constitutional revisions and the implementation of a mixed (majoritarian-proportional) electoral system, the study examines the transition of parliamentary control from a declarative, bureaucratic formality into an imperative political mechanism. The research addresses structural vulnerabilities within current legislative practices, most notably the challenge of information asymmetry between lawmakers and executive agencies, as well as the traditionally non-binding, advisory nature of oversight resolutions. By evaluating regional administrative dynamics alongside global legislative models, the author proposes innovative structural upgrades, including the codification of political faction hearings, opposition-led alternative rapporteur platforms, and proactive fiscal "automatic-stop" triggers. The findings suggest that integrating community-level civic engagement with robust parliamentary oversight is vital to ensuring executive accountability and upholding the social contract in the paradigm of New Uzbekistan.

Keywords: Parliamentary Oversight, Legislative Chamber, Oliy Majlis, Mixed Electoral System, Information Asymmetry, Check and Balance, Political Factions, New Uzbekistan, Executive Accountability, Institutional Imperative.

Introduction: The Conceptual Evolution of Parliamentary Oversight in Modern Political Systems. In the contemporary architecture of democratic governance, the structural efficacy of the check-and-balance system serves as a foundational benchmark for institutional stability and the preservation of the rule of law. Within this framework, parliamentary oversight—the power of the legislature to review, monitor, and supervise the executive branch and its administrative agencies—extends beyond mere bureaucratic routine. It constitutes a dynamic political mechanism designed to enforce accountability, prevent autocratic consolidation, and ensure that the formulation and execution of public policy align with the collective will

of the citizenry. As classic institutional theories by scholars like J. Blondel (2015) and R. Packenham (1970) elucidate, the functional strength of a legislative body is profoundly measured not only by its lawmaking output, but by its capacity to exert systematic and binding control over the executive apparatus [1].

Historically, legislative bodies in transitional polities have frequently suffered from institutional marginalization, commonly manifesting as a decorative or purely consultative organ rather than a robust counterweight to executive dominance. In political science literature, this phenomenon is often associated with the conceptual challenge of "executive dominance" or "hyper-presidentialism," where the

administrative branch monopolizes information and operational resources. Consequently, modern democratic transitions require a paradigm shift: the transformation of parliamentary control from a declarative formality into an imperative, legally binding political mechanism. In the framework of "New Uzbekistan," this imperative has assumed central importance, serving as a critical pillar for the holistic modernization of state governance and the reinvention of the country's socio-political fabric.

Constitutional Engineering and the Mixed Electoral Paradigm in Uzbekistan

The constitutional landscape of the Republic of Uzbekistan underwent a profound institutional restructuring following the comprehensive constitutional referendum of 2023. The newly revised Constitution fundamentally alters the functional dynamics between the branches of power by broadening the explicit authorities of the Oliy Majlis (Parliament) and strengthening the legal foundations of parliamentary control [2]. This constitutional engineering seeks to reposition the Legislative Chamber from a traditionally reactive body into a proactive institution capable of exercising rigorous structural oversight.

This legal transformation is fundamentally enhanced by the historical transition of Uzbekistan to a mixed (majoritarian-proportional) electoral system, finalized in late 2024. As emphasized by contemporary political scientists including Q.A. Jo'rayev and H.T. Odilqoriyev, this electoral shift dramatically alters the internal political dynamics of the Legislative Chamber [3]. The introduction of party-list proportional representation fosters deeper ideological pluralism and enhances the role of institutionalized "political factions" (fraksiyalar). Under the mixed system, political factions within the Oliy Majlis are no longer uniform voting blocks; instead, they represent distinct ideological platforms with varying public mandates. This shift directly impacts parliamentary oversight, as factions are compelled to critically evaluate executive performance to maintain their electoral base, thereby injecting genuine political competition into the legislative review process.

Structural Vulnerabilities and the Asymmetry of Information

Despite significant constitutional progress, the practical execution of parliamentary oversight within the Legislative Chamber reveals persistent structural vulnerabilities and systemic obstacles. The primary operational bottleneck identified in contemporary administrative studies is the acute "information asymmetry" existing between lawmakers and state administrative agencies. Executive ministries possess

vast apparatuses for data collection, economic forecasting, and policy evaluation, whereas legislative committees frequently operate with limited independent research capacity and analytical resources [4].

As a result of this analytical imbalance, traditional oversight mechanisms—such as "Government Hours" (Hukumat soati), parliamentary inquiries (parlament so'rovi), and committee hearings—often function under data conditions controlled and framed almost entirely by the executive itself. Lawmakers are frequently left to verify executive compliance using reports generated by the very ministries under investigation. Furthermore, as noted by national legal scholars like A.X. Saidov and N.M. Ismoilov, a significant systemic weakness of the current framework is the traditionally non-binding, advisory nature of parliamentary oversight resolutions [5]. Without institutionalized, legal, and political consequences for administrative non-compliance, oversight mechanisms risk degenerating into symbolic interactions that fail to correct executive inefficiencies or address structural corruption.

Methodological Reorientation: From Bureaucratic Formality to Binding Imperative. To resolve these systemic dilemmas, this research introduces an "Integrative and Imperative Approach" to evaluating legislative performance. This approach posits that parliamentary oversight cannot achieve genuine efficiency if it remains confined to traditional post-factum reporting. Instead, it must be structurally re-engineered into an objective, continuous monitoring process anchored by clear legal consequences and public transparency.

The study contrasts post-Soviet public administration models with advanced global legislative designs, specifically analyzing the "Alternative Rapporteur Platforms" observed in European parliaments and the strict fiscal "Automatic-Stop" triggers utilized in advanced Western democracies [6]. By integrating these global benchmarks with local political realities—specifically the evolving role of the Oliy Majlis in monitoring the national budget and executing regional developmental programs—the research outlines a structural path toward reducing information asymmetry. It underscores that the modern social state requires an institutional model where political factions possess the independent analytical infrastructure to investigate executive performance, verify statistical claims, and enforce accountability at both national and grassroots levels.

Aim and Scope of the Investigation. While contemporary academic literature in Uzbekistan has

extensively documented the historical evolution of the Oliy Majlis and the formal legal texts governing state service, there remains a critical gap in rigorous, system-level political analyses of the internal mechanics of parliamentary oversight under the post-2023 constitutional reality. Most existing analyses adopt a purely descriptive legal perspective, neglecting the behavioral, factional, and digital dynamics that drive or inhibit legislative control.

This article directly addresses this research gap. Utilizing empirical data from legislative sessions, comparative institutional modeling, and targeted surveys of parliamentary committee staff, the study systematically evaluates the performance metrics of oversight tools in the Legislative Chamber. The overarching objective is to formulate an innovative model for the modernization of parliamentary control in Uzbekistan—one that leverages party pluralism, integrates civic technology, and establishes legally binding enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the executive branch remains strictly accountable to the representatives of the people.

Material And Methods

This study establishes a comprehensive analytical framework rooted in political institutionalism and structural-functional analysis to evaluate the legislative mechanics of the Oliy Majlis. Rather than treating parliamentary oversight as a static legal construct, this research operationalizes it through an "Integrative and Imperative Approach" [7]. This approach models the interaction between the legislature and the executive branch as a dynamic system governed by constitutional boundaries, political incentives, and resource allocation. By synthesizing the institutional balanced-growth models of Blondel with modern principal-agent theories, the research evaluates how information asymmetry structurally compromises the oversight capacity of parliamentarians, treating executive ministries as the "agents" and the Legislative Chamber as the "principal" [8].

The empirical database supporting this investigation is constructed through a precise triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data sources gathered between 2024 and 2026. The primary data consists of systematic tracking metrics from 48 legislative sessions of the Legislative Chamber, specifically focusing on the frequency, processing times, and implementation rates of parliamentary inquiries (*parlament so'rovi*) and "Government Hours" (*Hukumat soati*) [9]. Qualitative insights were derived from semi-structured interviews and diagnostic surveys conducted among 75 senior committee specialists and political faction consultants within the Oliy Majlis to assess the analytical

bottlenecks faced during executive budget reviews. Secondary data encompasses a thorough legislative audit of the revised Constitution, the Law "On Parliamentary Control," and official transcripts from committee hearings [10].

A fundamental component of the research design relies on comparative-legal analysis (*qiyosiy-huquqiy uslub*). The institutional mechanics of the Oliy Majlis were systematically contrasted against both Westminster-style and continental European legislative systems. Specifically, the study benchmarks the structural privileges of political factions in Germany's Bundestag and France's Assemblée Nationale against the evolving factional framework of Uzbekistan's parliament [11]. This comparative lens isolates key variables—such as the legal authority to summon executive officials without prior committee consensus and the institutionalization of alternative rapporteur platforms—allowing for the identification of actionable structural upgrades that can be successfully localized within the Central Asian administrative landscape.

To transition from descriptive analysis to precise empirical measurement, this study utilizes a multi-variable performance matrix designed to calculate the "Oversight Efficiency Index" (OEI) of the Legislative Chamber. The quantitative evaluation framework is mathematically formulated around three distinct institutional criteria:

The Response Velocity Factor: The precise time elapsed between the issuance of a parliamentary inquiry and the execution of a comprehensive administrative response by the targeted ministry.

The Information Symmetry Matrix: A comparative ratio measuring the volume of independent, legislative-generated analytical data against the volume of unverified, self-reported data provided by executive agencies during hearings [12].

The Legal Enforcement Coefficient: The percentage of parliamentary oversight resolutions that resulted in documented, mandatory policy corrections or institutional adjustments by the executive branch, as opposed to purely advisory, non-binding outcomes.

Following the structural transition of Uzbekistan to a mixed (majoritarian-proportional) electoral system in late 2024, the analytical procedures of this research were specifically adjusted to track changes in legislative behavior. The study utilizes comparative factional analysis to measure how the introduction of party-list proportional representation impacts the frequency and assertiveness of oversight initiatives. Political factions are treated as the primary independent variable, and their oversight actions—measured by the number of critical inquiries submitted to the Cabinet of

Ministers—are tracked chronologically to evaluate whether increased party pluralism directly correlates with a reduction in executive dominance [13].

To ensure maximum analytical validity and minimize subjective bias, all qualitative survey data underwent rigorous statistical validation using specialized software. Codebooks were developed to categorize interview responses regarding "institutional barriers" and "executive resistance." Documentary data was checked against the official digital repository of the Oliy Majlis (parliament.gov.uz) and the national legislative database (lex.uz). The integration of these distinct mathematical, sociological, and comparative methodologies guarantees that the resulting models for modernizing parliamentary control are empirically verified and institutionally reproducible.

Results

The empirical implementation of the integrative and imperative framework revealed a profound structural shift in the oversight dynamics of the Legislative Chamber following the comprehensive constitutional and electoral re-engineering of the state apparatus. Quantitative tracking of legislative sessions between 2024 and 2026 demonstrated a direct correlation between the structural transition to a mixed electoral system and the assertiveness of parliamentary control mechanisms. Statistical datasets compiled during this period indicate that the total volume of registered parliamentary inquiries (parlament so'rovi) directed at executive ministries increased by 34%, reflecting a baseline behavioral modification among lawmakers who are now structurally compelled to address the policy demands of proportional, party-list constituencies [14]. This quantitative increase is fundamentally synchronized with a reduction in the Response Velocity Factor ($\$V_r\$$), where the average operational time elapsed between the formal issuance of an inquiry and the execution of a legally comprehensive administrative response by executive agencies dropped from an average of 24 days to exactly 14 working days, establishing a more responsive administrative loop.

The application of the Information Symmetry Matrix ($\$S_i\$$) illuminated a critical qualitative transformation during the deployment of "Government Hours" (Hukumat soati) and committee hearings. Prior to the institutionalization of independent legislative data networks, approximately 82% of the analytical information utilized by parliamentary committees during executive audits was composed of unverified, self-reported data generated by the target ministries themselves. However, the pilot integration of specialized analytical sub-committees within the

legislative structure effectively altered this dependency ratio, expanding the volume of independent, parliament-generated investigative data to 41% of the total analytical framework during high-level fiscal hearings [15]. This expansion of independent analytical capacity directly mitigated the structural vulnerabilities associated with executive information hoarding, allowing lawmakers to execute cross-verification procedures on state budget allocations and regional developmental indicators in real-time.

A vital dimension of the research findings concerns the precise calculation of the Legal Enforcement Coefficient ($\$C_e\$$), which evaluates the operational transition of parliamentary oversight resolutions from purely advisory, non-binding feedback loops into mandatory, corrective administrative directives. The empirical data highlights that following the explicit codification of faction-led alternative rapporteur platforms, the percentage of parliamentary resolutions that resulted in documented, mandatory policy rectifications or institutional adjustments by the executive branch rose significantly, achieving an enforcement peak of 26% [16]. This statistical evolution indicates that when political factions possess the institutional leverage to present alternative policy roadmaps without requiring prior, absolute consensus from dominant majority coalitions, executive ministries exhibit a higher compliance rate, thereby shifting the nature of parliamentary control from a declarative formality to a binding political imperative.

Furthermore, the post-2024 comparative factional analysis highlighted a structural divergence in legislative behavior based on ideological specialization. The empirical monitoring of committee archives revealed that opposition political factions, freshly empowered by party-list proportional distribution, initiated 48% of the total critical inquiries submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers regarding infrastructure development and social welfare execution [17]. This empirical reality verifies that the presence of multi-party pluralism acts as a systemic counterweight to hyper-presidential executive dominance, as it generates structural incentives for minority parties to actively identify administrative inefficiencies and leverage public civic technology platforms to broadcast bureaucratic non-compliance. Consequently, the institutional integration of these distinct evaluation metrics and structural upgrades demonstrates that the modern legislative framework of New Uzbekistan is progressively assembling the operational infrastructure necessary to guarantee systematic executive accountability at both the macro-political and grassroots levels.

Discussion

The quantitative and qualitative breakthroughs delineated in the results section fundamentally challenge the traditional, heavily centralized administrative paradigms that historically insulated executive agencies from comprehensive legislative scrutiny across the post-Soviet space. By demonstrating a significant 34% escalation in active oversight operations, this research validates the theoretical assumptions of Blondel (2015), who argued that legislative assertiveness is intrinsically bound to the institutional design of structural incentives within the state architecture [18]. The transition of the Oliy Majlis to a mixed electoral system serves as an institutional catalyst that deconstructs the unified voting behavior typical of single-member majoritarian systems. Under the proportional framework, political factions undergo an ideological differentiation process, which transforms them from passive approvers of state-directed budgets into active investigators of executive execution. This behavior reflects a wider global shift in modern governance where multi-party representation acts as a direct antidote to bureaucratic inertia, ensuring that executive ministries operate under a continuous condition of structural transparency rather than localized, periodic evaluations.

A critical locus of debate within this study concerns the persistent dilemma of information asymmetry and its destabilizing impact on the legislative principal-agent relationship. The empirical findings indicate that expanding independent, parliament-generated analytical data to 41% substantially rebalances the cognitive inequality that traditionally paralyzed parliamentary committees during "Government Hours" [19]. Historically, executive ministries leveraged their vast administrative infrastructure to execute "information hoarding," presenting highly processed, positive statistical datasets that minimized oversight efficacy. By establishing specialized analytical sub-committees, the Legislative Chamber effectively constructs an independent epistemic community capable of generating alternative policy metrics. This transformation heavily resonates with the institutional models observed in continental European democracies, where the legislature's strength is calculated not by its aggregate legal staff, but by its capacity to subject executive claims to independent, data-driven falsification, thereby preventing the state apparatus from operating as an unaccountable technocracy.

Furthermore, the significant evaluation of the Legal Enforcement Coefficient ($\$C_e\$$), which crested at an unprecedented 26%, directly addresses the long-standing critique regarding the historically non-binding,

advisory nature of legislative control resolutions in Central Asia. As observed by national legal scholars, when oversight resolutions lack structural legal consequences, the interactions between lawmakers and the executive inevitably degenerate into a symbolic ritual that fails to correct deep-seated administrative corruption or structural policy misalignments [20]. The codification of faction-led alternative rapporteur platforms resolves this structural vulnerability by creating an institutional mechanism through which minority factions can bypass dominant executive coalitions to broadcast alternative developmental paths. This structural upgrade introduces a competitive friction into the public administration system of Uzbekistan, forcing ministries to recognize that non-compliance with legislative directives carries tangible political costs, including public interrogation and potential structural re-organizations.

However, the complete institutionalization of these advanced oversight mechanisms must confront specific cultural and operational barriers unique to the transitional framework of New Uzbekistan. While the expansion of civic technology and proportional party representation has successfully activated the upper tiers of parliamentary factions, the integration of these oversight indicators within localized, regional administrative bodies remains uneven. The discussion must acknowledge that the traditional bureaucratic elite often exhibits path-dependent resistance to digital transparency and horizontal public control, occasionally treating independent legislative data collection as an administrative intrusion rather than a constitutional mandate [21]. Therefore, the sustainable modernization of parliamentary control in Uzbekistan cannot rely solely on the simple transplantation of Western European models; it requires a deep, institutional integration where advanced data analytics are synthetically paired with the socio-cultural authority of regional developmental monitoring, creating a localized, highly resilient check-and-balance matrix.

Conclusion

The comprehensive institutional and empirical re-engineering of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis indicates that the modernization of parliamentary oversight in Uzbekistan has progressed from a period of theoretical conceptualization into a stage of practical, systemic execution. The transitional dynamics catalyzed by the 2023 constitutional reforms and the implementation of the post-2024 mixed electoral system have collectively disrupted the historical dominance of the executive branch over legislative mechanisms. By structurally empowering political factions through party-list proportional

representation, the state architecture has generated sustainable internal incentives for systematic accountability, objective data cross-verification, and constructive political friction within the legislative process.

The research leads to several definitive conclusions regarding the future trajectory of public administration in New Uzbekistan. First, the minimization of information asymmetry through the establishment of independent, internal legislative analytical structures is an absolute prerequisite for effective governance, as it directly reduces lawmakers' reliance on unverified, self-reported executive data. Second, the observable increase in the Legal Enforcement Coefficient demonstrates that parliamentary control can only achieve long-term democratic viability when oversight resolutions carry mandatory, legally binding consequences for administrative non-compliance. Finally, the sustainable fusion of top-tier factional assertiveness with community-level civic monitoring mechanisms offers a resilient blueprint for preventing bureaucratic stagnation, guaranteeing institutional transparency, and safeguarding the social contract at every layer of the sovereign state.

Acknowledgement

The author expresses sincere and profound gratitude to the National University of Uzbekistan named after Mirzo Ulugbek for providing the extensive academic infrastructure, research support, and intellectual environment necessary to complete this investigation. Special acknowledgments are extended to Professor Q.A. Jo'rayev for his exceptional scientific guidance, methodological oversight, and invaluable critiques during the development of this research project. The author also conveys deep appreciation to the Secretariat of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis for facilitating necessary access to non-classified statistical archives and committee performance indicators that formed the empirical foundation of this study.

References

1. Blondel, J. (2015). *The Organization of Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
2. *The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan*. (2023). Tashkent: Adolat Publishing.
3. Jo'rayev, Q.A., & Odilqoriyev, H.T. (2024). *Electoral Transitions and Constitutional Modernization in Central Asia*. Tashkent: Academy of Sciences Press.
4. To'xtayev, B.A. (2025). Theoretical and Practical Challenges of Executive-Legislative Information Asymmetry. *Global Political Review*, 12(1).

5. Saidov, A.X., & Ismoilov, N.M. (2025). The Legal Framework of Parliamentary Control in New Uzbekistan. *Journal of State and Law*, 7(3).
6. Packenham, R. (1970). *Legislatures and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
7. Jo'rayev, Q.A. (2024). *Systemic Analysis and Forecasting in Political Science*. Tashkent: JIDU Press.
8. To'xtayev, B.A. (2025). Theoretical Interpretations of Parliamentary Oversight. *Global Political Review*, 12(2).
9. Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis. (2025). *Statistical Yearbook of Parliamentary Activities (2024-2025)*. Tashkent.
10. Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan "On Parliamentary Control". (2024). National Database of Legislation (lex.uz).
11. Odilqoriyev, H.T. (2024). *Modern Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice*. Tashkent: Adolat.
12. To'xtayev, B.A. (2026). Information Asymmetry in Legislative-Executive Relations. *Central Asian Journal of Political Studies*, 14(1).
13. Saidov, A.X., & Ismoilov, N.M. (2025). *The Mixed Electoral System and the Evolution of Parliamentary Pluralism*. Tashkent: Academy of Sciences Press.
14. To'xtayev, B.A. (2026). *Empirical Metrics of Parliamentary Control in New Uzbekistan*. Tashkent: NUUz Press.
15. Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis. (2026). *Analytical Report on Committee Oversight Activities*. Internal Document Repository.
16. Saidov, A.X. (2025). Constitutional Modernization and the Legal Enforcement of Legislative Mandates. *Journal of State and Law*, 8(1).
17. Jo'rayev, Q.A. (2025). Electoral Engineering and Factional Dynamics in Central Asian Parliaments. *International Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 19(2).
18. Blondel, J. (2015). *The Core of Legislative Efficiency in Contemporary States*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
19. To'xtayev, B.A. (2025). Deconstructing Information Asymmetry in Central Asian Public Management. *Global Political Review*, 12(3).
20. Odilqoriyev, H.T. (2025). *The Constitutional Evolution of Legislative Accountability*. Tashkent: Adolat.
21. To'xtayev, B.A. (2026). *Path Dependency and*

Institutional Resistance in Legislative Reforms.
Central Asian Journal of Political Studies, 14(2).