

Islamic Factor in The Armed Forces and Its Influence on State Policy

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Abstract: This article examines the evolution of attitudes toward Islam within the armed forces-army system and the factors that influenced this attitude, including the strengthening of the idea of "Jihad for the Motherland" in the wars with India over Kashmir and the significance of factors such as the Islamization of the state during the reign of Zia ul-Haq.

Keywords: Islamic Republic of Pakistan, army, India, Kashmir, jihad, armed forces, Islam, Ziya ul-Haq, Islamization, national identity.

Introduction: The Islamic factor in Pakistan's armed forces serves as a significant historical determinant in shaping the country's political and military institutions. Against the backdrop of political gaps and territorial conflicts that emerged after independence, the role of religious identity as a means of political legitimacy has increased. In the armed forces, Islamic principles and religious values were reflected not only in personnel policy and the military education system but also exerted a significant influence on strategic decision-making, internal conflict resolution, and the maintenance of civil-military balance. Thus, the religious factor played an important role in determining the internal structure and strategic directions of the army.

The influence of the Islamic factor in the armed forces on state policy developed in close connection with the regional and domestic political context. While religious legitimacy was used as a strategic tool in political decision-making, the role of the army in the political system was also strengthened by religious-national identity. As a result, the religious factor was reflected not only in ensuring the internal discipline and unity of military institutions, but also in determining the internal and external directions of state policy. This process can be seen as a decisive factor in shaping the

political system and the unique institutional configuration of Pakistan's armed forces.

The prime minister's big mistake was in choosing the commander of the Pakistani army. Ziya ul-Haq became it in April 1976. It reminded me of the confrontation between Pinochet and Alende in Chile. Z.A. Bhutto considered General Ziya ul-Haq a person on whom he could rely for the support of his government. Another disastrous move was that Prime Minister Zia-ul-Haq believed a fake intelligence report shortly after his appointment. The report recommended holding early elections and stated that there would be no real opposition.

The PPP campaign was aimed at securing an absolute majority of votes. However, in some districts, the candidates of the ruling party could not even hold meetings due to the strongest opposition. Bhutto would likely have won the election without the interference of his supporters, but on the ground, they were engaged in blatant falsification. As a result, large-scale protests began in the country. In this situation, the Pakistan National Alliance (PAA) was formed, consisting of 9 political parties, one of which was Jamoat-e Islami, and the PAA launched a mass campaign against Bhutto's falsifications and methods of fighting the opposition.

The Prime Minister demanded that the army commander declare martial law. The country was paralyzed by nationwide strikes, and the Constitutional Court declared martial law illegal. Z.A. Bhutto unexpectedly called for new elections. Apparently, he believed that if the opposition gained a majority in all 4 provinces, it could exercise its constitutional right and dissolve the National Assembly.

On July 5, 1977, General Zia ul-Haq carried out a military coup and removed Z.A. Bhutto from power. At the heart of this coup lay the revival of Islamic radicalism, as indicated by calls for an immediate return to Islam and the transformation of Pakistan into an Islamic state. The military leader sought the support of religious groups and sought dialogue with them.

In September 1977, Z.A. Bhutto was arrested on charges of plotting to assassinate his political opponent. The Muslim League immediately held a political rally demanding his death sentence. The hearing of the case lasted 18 months and Z.A. Bhutto was convicted with a slight advantage. Many observers noted that the military is exerting pressure on the judges. Zia ul-Haq rejected the amnesty decision. The military leader, seeking to evade responsibility, said: "I did not sentence him to death, and if they (the court) find him guilty, I will not release him..." Z.A. Bhutto was famous not only among the people but also in the ranks of the army. Roedad Khan, who witnessed the described events, recalled that after the execution, it was "received with deep sorrow by all the military."

Upon coming to power, Zia-ul-Haq realized that he had violated Article 6 of the constitution, which states that "attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, or seizing power through political intrigue or the use of force, constitutes high treason." He said: "What is a constitution? It's a twelve or ten-page book. I can throw them away and tell them that tomorrow we will live in a different system. Today, people go wherever I lead them. "All politicians, including the once-powerful Mr. Bhutto, will be forced to obey me."

Despite his strong self-confidence, Zia ul-Haq hastened to convince everyone that the emergency measures were temporary; he did not repeal the main law, but only suspended it. He understood that by abolishing the constitution, he would break the law and become illegal in the eyes of the world community. Nevertheless, during his time in power, the constitution underwent powerful changes: the imbalance between the legislative and executive branches intensified toward the latter.

Furthermore, Zia ul-Haq, as a pragmatic politician, sought to avoid the mistakes of his predecessors. First and foremost, we are talking about Ayub Khan, who

gained absolute power and resigned as Chief of Army Staff, allowing the army, having lost its support, to overthrow him over time. Throughout his reign, Zia-ul-Haq continued to combine the positions of civilian and military leadership (from 1985 to 1988, he combined the positions of president of the country and commander-in-chief of the army).

Striving to strengthen the social foundation of his regime, the general, first and foremost, drew closer to Pakistan's large bourgeoisie and business circles, carried out large-scale denationalization, and returned enterprises to their former owners. Zia ul-Haq, acting in the interests of the land aristocracy, nullified Z.A. Bhutto's initiatives aimed at reducing the maximum permissible size of land ownership.

The military leader not only included representatives of business circles in the government but also returned to the practice of providing benefits to foreign investors, which, of course, led to an increase in the inflow of financial resources from abroad. To be fair, it is not true that foreign investment swept through Pakistan after al-Haq came to power: by 1988, it had not even exceeded 3.4 percent of GDP. The reason for this was the military administration's inability to ensure sustainable economic growth and protect the interests of private capital. High level of bureaucracy, excessive share of funds for maintenance of the military-administrative apparatus (60% of the budget), financial shortages necessitated double taxation (Muslim taxes—zakat and ushr—were added to ordinary taxes). This could have provoked a negative reaction from the big bourgeoisie and led to a decline in business activity, the outflow of funds from national banks, and so on.

In the 1980s, the country's economic development was relatively successful. At that time, many Pakistanis went to work in the rich oil-exporting countries of the Middle East and made money transfers to their families. Certain successes were also achieved in industry, while the share of agriculture decreased (though in 1986 it provided more than 1/4 of the gross domestic product and over 45% of export revenues) and the share of recycling has increased. Nevertheless, despite all the successes, the economic situation remained extremely unstable.

Zia ul-Haq directed all his efforts toward the Islamization of all spheres of the country's life. In world scientific circles, there is an opinion that the military leader was a true believer: "he served in the Indian colonial army even before the formation of Pakistan, and his religiosity was clearly manifested during his military service. He personally admitted that he prayed while other officers spent their free time drinking, gambling, and dancing. The author questions the

general's personal religiosity, but Ziya ul-Haq skillfully used the Islamic factor as a political weapon to strengthen his regime. Moreover, Islam as an ideology could offer its own solution, including economic problems.

Seeking to win over the Islamists, Ziya ul-Haq skillfully took advantage of the global Islamic revivalism, which had intensified especially after the Shah's revolution in Iran, and included representatives of religious parties in the government. Not only zakat and ushr, but also bank interest were prohibited.

The army itself has become a powerful tool for the Islamization of all aspects of life. It was during the reign of General ul-Haq that it became Pakistan in spirit, if the classification of the American researcher Stephen Cohen is used: the British period (1947-1953), the American period (1953-1965), and finally the Pakistani period. During Ul-Haq's time in power, the social composition of the commanding corps changed. "Officers who had learned English, as well as most of those trained by the Americans, left." Instead of representatives of this elite from the upper strata of society who held secular positions, as a result of the expansion of the army's ranks, the officer corps was replenished with representatives of the middle classes and wealthy peasant families close to fundamental religious views. They were educated in Pakistan and fell under the influence of Islamic forces during their studies. Ziya ul-Haq began mass recruitment into the army of people from the lower classes of cities and villages who traditionally had an idea of the need to Islamise even the political sphere. Furthermore, the nature of military education, in which a religious orientation emerged, also changed. For example, officers were required to read S.K. Malik's book "The Quranic Concept of War." The Directorate of Religious Education was established to oversee the religious education of the military. The main postulate of S.K. Malik's book can be expressed in one phrase:

"War begins by the will of God, therefore it is governed and conditioned by the Word of God." The preface to this work belongs to the pen of the general, who writes that "a professional soldier in the Muslim army, pursuing the goal of protecting the Islamic state, cannot be a professional if he does not act under the banner of Allah in all his actions." It is this approach that has helped to transform the Pakistani army into a "truly Pakistani-spirited," i.e. Islamic army, linking the strategy of military-political goal setting with the concept of jihad.

Furthermore, the army will be given the opportunity to be a defender not only of state borders and purely military interests but also of ideology. It was during this

period (1980) that the Federal Sharia Court was established, which headed the system of Islamic justice bodies and operated in parallel with the civil institutions of the judiciary. In Pakistan, medieval Islamic punishments were introduced: cutting off the hand, stoning, etc.

The army was in a privileged position. By the early 1980s, \$1.89 billion was spent annually on the 478,600-strong army (6.9% of GDP, 28.1% of budget expenditures). At the same time, the graphs drawn by S. Cohen clearly show a fairly strict correspondence between the ratio of tanks and aircraft in the Indian and Pakistani armies in the 1960s and 1980s. By 1982, Pakistan's military spending had doubled compared to 1979, and by 1985, it had tripled, accounting for 46.5% of all budget expenditures. At the end of the 1980s, the Pakistani army numbered 480,000 men. 2.2 billion soums per year are allocated for its maintenance.

In 1983, Ziya ul-Haq faced a nationwide movement to maintain the democratic course of state-building development. Religious minorities became politically isolated. Realizing that his initiatives were not of a legal nature, in 1984 Ziya ul-Haq authorized a referendum, to which a single question consisting of three sub-clauses was put, but it was not possible to answer each of them separately. The question was as follows: "If the majority of those who voted answer 'yes', then the people of Pakistan will ask the president to bring the country's laws into compliance with the requirements of Islam as set forth in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet, It signifies the approval of all steps taken by Pakistan to protect its ideology and to continue and strengthen the process of the peaceful and legitimate transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people, and General M. Z. ul-Haq is the legitimate elected president of Pakistan for a five-year term, starting from the first joint session of both houses of parliament. Due to the religious and democratic nature of this issue and the prohibition of propaganda activities by opposition forces, 97 percent of the population voted "yes" with a turnout of 62 percent.

After coming to power, the military leader spoke of his lack of political ambitions and emphasized that he had no other concerns other than organizing democratic elections in 90 days. However, the elections were postponed several times, and the general focused all his efforts on strengthening his regime, as his authority threatened to grow after Bhutto's death.

Ziya ul-Haq's position in support of the mujahideen in Afghanistan led to certain successes. The US not only saw an ally in Pakistan but also managed to use it to supply money and weapons to the mujahideen,

including Osama bin Laden and other Saudi militants (the future core of Al-Qaeda). According to the calculations of the international charity Oxfam, founded in Oxford in 1942, the United States spent about 3 billion US dollars in 1980-1989 alone on providing economic and military assistance to the mujahideen. At the same time, the fact that Pakistan had created nuclear weapons (and, according to several experts, tested them on Chinese territory) did not concern the United States.

As early as 1975, a Pakistani citizen, Dr. A. K. Khan, who possessed classified information from the German-British-Dutch joint concern URENCO regarding the uranium enrichment plant in Olmeló (Netherlands), left with all the materials for his country, where all conditions for conducting research had been created for him. In an interview in 1984, the scientist announced that Pakistan had achieved a high-tech level of uranium enrichment not inferior to all nuclear powers.

When Zia-ul-Haq came to power, the nuclear program was resumed. According to A. Kapur, a Canadian professor at the University of Waterloo, the main difference between the policy of the Zia-ul-Haq administration in this area and the previous one was the refusal to test nuclear devices.

In June 1984, A. Cranston, Deputy Democratic Minority Leader in the U.S. Senate, presented a document on Pakistan's nuclear potential. The document states that at the secretly built uranium enrichment plant in Kakhut, the units were capable of producing 15 kg of highly enriched uranium, which allowed Pakistan to create 30 atomic bombs by the early 1990s. In the first half of the 1980s, the construction of a nuclear fuel processing plant in Chasm, Pakistan, was almost completed, allowing for the production of one plutonium bomb per year. The document also states that none of Pakistan's nuclear programs are related to the peaceful use of nuclear weapons. In 1984, a Pakistani citizen was arrested in the United States while attempting to carry 50 high-speed electronic switches, which are typically used for nuclear weapons. As early as 1985, there were reports that Islamabad had successfully tested Creighton detonators, Made in the USA and designed for nuclear weapons. In 1986, it was discovered that two Swiss companies had supplied equipment to Pakistan to operate the Kahut uranium enrichment plant between 1978 and 1981. In July 1987, a Pakistani citizen was arrested in Philadelphia while attempting to smuggle 25 tons of specially alloyed steel used in nuclear programs to Pakistan. In February 1989, the West German magazine Spiegel reported that more than 70 German companies had supplied Pakistan with devices, equipment, and raw materials necessary for

the development of nuclear weapons.

According to Indian data, in the second half of the 1980s, Pakistan also had a nuclear fuel processing plant in Islamabad, a heavy water plant in Multon, and a nuclear plant in Karachi. In 1987, A. K. Khan stated in an interview with the renowned journalist K. Nayar that uranium in Pakistan would be enriched to 90%, and in peaceful research programs, the enrichment rate is unprecedentedly low. According to British expert Dr. Fr. Barnaby, at the end of the 1980s, about 1,000 centrifuges were operating in Pakistan, producing 45 kg of highly enriched uranium (i.e., their capacity tripled in three years). In March 1987, Ziya ul-Haq himself said in an interview with Time magazine, "You can write that Pakistan is capable of creating a bomb at any time." Ziya ul-Haq himself, in an interview with The New York Times, called himself an "uncompromising fighter for the atomic and Islamic era."

However, until the late 1980s, the U.S. not only did not put any pressure on the Pakistani government over their nuclear program, but also sent multibillion-dollar financial and military aid to Pakistan annually. Both J. Carter and R. Reagan violated American laws in this regard with the aim of breaking up the USSR.

It was with the war in Afghanistan that the closest contact between Pakistani officials and Islamist terrorists began, contributed not only by the United States but also by the dictatorial regimes of Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Close ties were established among the Islamists, Afghan mujahideen bases were located on Pakistani territory, militants were recruited into madrasas to participate in the war, and their numbers were constantly increasing.

It is not surprising that there are representatives of the Shia minority (the Ja'fari Right Implementation Movement), the PPP, and the Restoration of Democracy Movement against the military. Party activists were in favor of holding the elections on a party basis, while Ziya ul-Haq agreed to hold them without a party to prevent the entry of unsympathetic elements into the power structures. The voting results showed that the military regime did not have widespread support among them: the population's participation only indicated that Punjab was sympathetic to the dictator. However, Zia-ul-Haq had a subordinate parliament.

The constitution was restored in December 1985. However, the general authorized and inspired the adoption of the Eighth Amendment, which gave the activities of the military administration a legal character and ensured its non-judiciability. The President again received the right of deferred veto, that is, legislative authority. He also had the right to hold a

referendum of his own free will, dissolve the lower house, and form a provisional government. On 23 March 1985, Zia ul-Haq became President of Pakistan while retaining the post of Chief of Army Staff. The post of prime minister was taken by a Sindhi political figure, Muhammad Junejo, who later led the de facto ruling Muslim League, loyal to a non-partisan president.

Martial law was also lifted on August 14. However, the political system could not withstand the internal disagreements between Zia ul-Haq and his prime minister. On May 29, 1988, the president dissolved the local legislative bodies, the National Assembly, and the government. For the first time in Pakistan's history, a military official held two top-level civilian positions in power. Realizing that his only support was the army and the clergy, he increased military spending by another 7 percent, obtained Senate approval of a law recognizing Sharia as the supreme law of the country (though the bill could not enter into force because it was not approved by the National Assembly).

Zia ul-Haq announced the date of new elections on a non-partisan basis, but the Supreme Court recognized the legal right of parties to participate in them based on the application of the daughter of the new leader of the PPP, Z.A. Bhutto Benazir.

On August 17, 1988, General ul-Haq was killed in a plane crash, along with the head of Pakistani intelligence and the Pakistani ambassador to the United States. Following the plane crash, events unfolded according to a justified and constitutionally prescribed scenario: the army decided to hand over the presidency to the head of the Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

Summarizing the interim results, it is worth noting that during the bipolar era, Pakistan experienced periods of both democratic rule and military dictatorship. The former was inevitably replaced by the latter, as civil politicians represented the overly multifaceted interests of the Pakistani masses, who had no understanding of democratic traditions at all. By the late 1980s, weary of a military dictatorship whose successes were relative, the country was ready to return to civilian rule.

Based on the above, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The integration of the Islamic factor into the military-political management of the state under Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq fundamentally changed the institutional nature of the Pakistani army. The recruitment of youth educated in religious madrasas into the officer corps, the inclusion of S.K. Malik's religious extremist work "The Quranic Concept of War" in the curricula of military educational organizations, and the

establishment of the Directorate of Religious Education transformed the army into a military-religious institution. The use of religious rhetoric for political purposes was not unique to Muhammad Ziaulhaq. In particular, Pakistani leaders Muhammad Ayyub Khan and Parvez Musharraf used this method to legitimize power. Muhammad Ziaulhaq, unlike others, turned this practice into an official institutional mechanism of state policy, which led to religious extremist sentiments taking a firm place in the armed forces.

2. Religious rhetoric in the history of Pakistan Zulfikar Bhutto's attempts to introduce "Islamic socialism" and Nawaz Sharif's attempts to constitutionally strengthen the norms of Sharia have become a means of legitimizing power. Also, Muhammad Ziaulhaq's policy of supporting the mujahideen in Afghanistan and turning the network of madrasas into a training base for combat personnel has brought these efforts to a level that threatens domestic political stability. While Pakistani state leaders used religious rhetoric primarily for domestic political interests, Muhammad Ziaulhaq used it to form transnational radical religious networks funded by the US and Saudi Arabia. However, as a result of the evolution of threats to political stability, Pakistan has fallen under the influence of its own religious extremist groups.

3. The practice of using the religious factor in Pakistan's domestic policy to promote its goals and ensure the legitimacy of decisions intensified during the reign of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. While Muhammad Ayyub Khan promoted Islamic modernization, Zulfikar Bhutto promoted Islamic socialism, and Parvez Musharraf promoted enlightened Islam, Muhammad Ziaulhaq made religious identity an integral part of the legitimization of power, military strategy, and state ideology. The institutional legacy of this phenomenon has narrowed the scope for maneuvering in relations with religious forces for all subsequent leaders, including civilian governments, and has made the system of military-civilian relations in Pakistan an even more complex and contradictory process.

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